INFLUENCES AFFECTING INTERNATIONAL
AVIATION POLICY
THOMAS BURKE*

Transportation has a fundamental relationship to every phase of a nation's wellbeing. The economic and cultural maturity of peoples and their governments depends upon it. The United States and Great Britain are classic examples of the
application of that principle; our neighbors of the Western Hemisphere, including
Canada, vividly demonstrate its less aggressive application. Therefore, the development of the airplane as a practical means of transporting passengers and cargo has
had a profound impact on the social, political and economic life of every nation on
earth.
As a matter of record, the airplane did not become a serious factor in transportation until after World War I. In fact, the technical development of aeronautics is
traceable to the stimulation which it received between 1914 and 1918. During that
period the military authorities of the world recognized the airplane as an important
instrument of reconnaissance and destruction. The exploitation of its lethal qualities
laid the groundwork for the development of its peace-time potentialities. Experience gained in World War I served to emphasize the fact that aviation could no
longer be treated as an exotic experiment.
As the direct beneficiary of this development, our air transport industry promptly
proceeded to link the resources and markets of the United States and Latin America
to a web of air routes. The resulting intensification of travel had a tangible effect
on every state in the Union and on our sovereign neighbors throughout the Western
Hemisphere. One thing is certain: the advent of practical air transportation in the
Americas served to destroy the political vacuum in which we had lived since the
Monroe Doctrine was promulgated.
In so far as the United States is concerned, the phenomenal advancement of its
domestic air transport industry resulted in cultural as well as commercial benefits.
The sheer dynamics of aviation and the uninhibited air element in which it functioned were psychological factors of vast importance. However, it is noteworthy
that, aside from the experience gained in Latin America by Pan American Airways
and its affiliates, this new form of transportation was considered mainly as an adjunct of the home economy. Such an attitude is attributable mainly to the fact that
the United States was the most ideal laboratory on earth in which to conduct the
experiment. On the other hand, the air transport systems of Europe were nurtured
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on a diametrically opposite philosophy. This is singularly true of Great Britain and
the Netherlands because of the nature of their geographical and economic interests.
In other words, their far-flung possessions and their dependence on foreign commerce made it imperative that their air transport systems be preponderantly of an
international character. It is to such fundamental considerations as these that we
may look for an explanation of the confused and restricted growth of international
aviation policy.
The determination of the international air policy of the United States calls for consideration of two factors: (I) the operations of United States flag lines in international commerce, and (2) the operations of foreign flag lines on a reciprocal basis to
or within United States territory. Between World War I and the passage of the Civil
Aeronautics Act in 1938, various divisions and bureaus of the Department of Commerce were entrusted with the regulatory and policy-making responsibilities, chiefly
in connection with the domestic aspects of aviation. However, when the first American flag air carrier ventured across our national boundaries, new complications
arose which promptly aroused the interest of the Department of State. Therefore,
in 1926 the Congress of the United States passed an act "to encourage and regulate
the use of aircraft in commerce and for other purposes." This act, which became
known as the Air Commerce Act of 1926, defined "air commerce' as "transportation
in whole or in part by aircraft of persons or property for hire, navigation of aircraft
in futtherance of business, or navigation of aircraft from one place to another for
operation in the conduct of a business." It then went on to state that the term
"interstate or foreign air commerce" meant air commerce between any state, territory or possession, or the District of Columbia "and any place outside thereof." Although the Air Commerce Act of i926 was a progressive step, it failed to meet the
demands placed upon it by the rapidly growing air transport industry. Twelve
years later the Congress enacted the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938.' Although far
from perfect, the 1938 Act has proven to be extremely satisfactory. Under it there
was created an administrative organization, known as the Civil Aeronautics Authority. It was comprised of five members, an administrator and an Air Safety Board.
Approximately two years later, as the result of President Roosevelt's desire for intradepartmental reorganization, the Civil Aeronautics Authority was redesignated as
the Civil Aeronautics Board, and has continued to function as such since that time.
The general powers and duties of this agency are described in Tide II, Section 205,
as follows:
"a. The Authority' is empowered to perform such acts, to conduct such investigations,
to issue and amend such orders, and to make and amend such general or specific rules,
regulations, and procedure, pursuant to and consistent with the provisions of this Act, as
it shall deem necessary to carry out such provisions and to exercise and perform its powers and duties under this Act."
152 STAT. 977 (1938), 49 U. S. C. §401 et seq. (1940).
-

Arnended by the Act of July 2, 1940, Pub. L. No. 721, to read: "The Civil Aeronautics Board."
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This authorization is significant against the background of policy declared in
the 1938 Act, in which policy the international aspect of aviation conspicuously
appears? Aside from comprehensive rules and regulations in connection with the
conduct of our domestic air transport system, the Act contains provisions concerning
the ,issuance of certificates and permits for international operations by American and
foreign air carriers. These provisions wisely recognized air transport as an instrumentality of national policy. This is borne out by the comprehensive "international"
provisions of the Act, such as those requiring the approval of the President 4 and
prescribing the functions of the Secretary of State5 in certain situations.
For a considerable time prior to 1938 a strong trend toward centralized authority
was taking place throughout the world. The corollary of this trend was an upsurge
of government intervention and, in many instances, government ownership. By
the time Hitler's armies overran Poland, very few truly independent private business
enterprises existed except in the United States. Official channels became the chief
means of communications between peoples, and the conduct of international relations
rapidly became an amalgam of "joint undertakings" involving economic, diplomatic
and military considerations.
By the fall of 1939 the principle of "mutual aid" had been fully aroused from
its peace-time dormancy and burgeoned prolifically until the surrender of Japan.
' Sec. 2 of the Act, 49 U. S. C. §402

(1940) is headed "Declaration of Policy," and provides:

"In the exercise and performance of its powers and duties under this Act, the Authority shall consider the following, among other things, as being in the public interest, and in accordance with the
public convenience and necessity"(a) The encouragement and development of an air-transportation system properly adapted to the
present and future needs of the foreign and domestic commerce of the United States, of the Postal Service, and of national defense;
"(b) The regulation of air transportation in such manner as to recognize and preserve the inherent
advantages of, assure the highest degree of safety in, and foster sound economic conditions in, such

transportation, and to improve the relations between, and coordinate transportation by, air carriers;
"(c)

The promotion of adequate, economical,

and efficient service by air carriers

at reasonable

charges, without unjust discriminations, undue preferences or advantages, or unfair or destructive competitive practices;
"(d) Competition to the extent necessary to assure the sound development of an air-transportation
system properly adapted to the needs of the foreign and domestic commerce of the United States, of the
Postal Service, and of the national defense;
"(e) The regulation of air commerce in such manner as to best promote its development and safety;
and
"(f) The encouragement and development of civil aeronautics."
Sec. 8oi of the Act, 49 U. S. C. §6ox (1940) provides: "The issuance, denial, transfer, amendment, cancelation, suspension, or revocation of, and the terms, conditions, and limitations contained in,
any certificate authorizing an air carrier to engage in overseas or foreign air transportation, or air transportation between places in the same Territory or possession, or any permit issuable to any foreign air
carrier under section 402, shall be subject to the approval of the President. Copies of all applications
in respect of such certificates and permits shall be transmitted to the President by the Authority before
hearing thereon, and all decisions thereon by the Authority shall be submitted to the Persident before
publication thereof. This section shall not apply to the issuance or denial of any certificate issuable
under section 401(e) or any permit issuable under section 402(c) or to the original terms, conditions,
or limitations of any such certificate or permit."
' Sec. 8o2 of the Act, 49 U. S. C. §6o2 (1940) provides: "The Secretary of State shall advise the
Authority of, and consult with the Authority concerning, the negotiation of any agreements with foreign
governments for the establishment or development of air navigation, including air routes and services."
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Most of the special "privileges" granted thereunder are "for the duration." Therefore it is likely that they will be terminated on short notice unless their prolongation
is formally approved by the government or governments that granted them. This
will bring into sharp focus the "privileges" granted by certain of the United Nations

to the Air Transport Commands of the Army Air Forces and "NATS," its Navy
counterpart. The extent and significance of these air transport operations is evident
in the performance of the Army Air Force organization which is the larger of the
two services. By the fall of 1944 the international routes of the Air Transport Command were extended to approximately i6o,ooo miles and literally gridironed the face

of the earth. In the spring of 1945 its "ferrying" and "transport" operations accounted for a total of nearly one and one-half million "flown" miles per day.
However, the greatest significance of the Air Transport Command operation
lies in the fact that its diversified and extensive war-time activities were carried on
in considerable proportion by private American air transport companies that were,
in effect, sub-contractors of both our Army and our Navy. Thus our private air
carriers accumulated an incalculable amount of international experience and created
for their industry a fund of prestige from which they may be expected to draw in
the days that lie ahead of us. On the other hand, the operating "privileges" extended to the Air Transport units of our Armed Forces on the basis of "military
necessity" may prove to be a distinct liability when our government attempts to
convert them into peace-time commercial "rights." In other words, the formidableness of our private international air carriers may add to the sum total of the psychological obstacles which will be encountered by our State Department negotiators.
In fact, it is apparent that the prestige which has accrued from the global air transport activities of our military establishments is believed by important British economists to constitute a dire threat to the trade position of the Empire. Thus it may
be expected that international air transport policy will not be considered solely from
the standpoint of aviation but, unfortunately, is likely to become engulfed in broader
considerations that each nation in its sovereign judgment deems to be necessary. For
instance, the tremendous impact of the war on the economy of Great Britain is unquestionable. Regardless of the denials of her statesmen, she is in serious difficulty
and undoubtedly will resort to the most drastic practises in order to regain her
equilibrium. Also, Russia's unpredictableness in that regard will serve further to
confuse the issues.
If we concede the vital importance of Great Britain and Russia in the shaping
of the postwar world, then it is imperative that we properly evaluate their respective
positions concerning international civil aviation. If we analyze the British position
from the standpoint of her past as well as her present situation, it will not be too
difficult to blueprint the motives behind her sometimes conflicting positions. The
same may be said of Russia, although the latter is infinitely more complicated and
difficult to analyze. Nevertheless, it would seem reasonable to assume that, in no
small measure, the attitudes of Britain and Russia are chargeable to diplomatic
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maneuvering. However, regardless of the dissimilarity of their motives and objectives, both governments have one thing in common: they consider non-military
aviation strictly as an economic dependency and therefore refuse to view its development except in relationship to overall policy.
On the other hand, the United States has appeared from time to time to favor
the view that business considerations should not be permitted solely to influence
international air transport policy, since cultural and security values "vital to the
future of mankind" are involved. Thus many interested United States officials hold
that aviation policy should be worked out independently of other problems. In that
connection, the following views were expressed by Mr. Welch Pogue, Chairman of
the Civil Aeronautics Board :"
"Indeed they are complex in the extreme. They are interrelated with many matters of
national concern and inject new considerations into the international field, a field already
filled with difficult issues. We make our first mistake, therefore, if we blithely approach
these problems upon the assumption that the future of aviation can be readily worked
out more or less as an incident to the consideration of other problems."
From the viewpoint of the United States it would appear to be logical and sound
to segregate international aviation problems from "interrelated matters" or, as is frequently the case, matters that are utterly unrelated. Unfortunately, however, the
international air transport policy of the United States, unlike its domestic counterpart, must be patterned in such a manner as to make it reasonably acceptable to the
sovereign governments whose airspace, terrain or territorial waters we would seek
to utilize. Experience shows that, aside from certain mutually desirable basic principles, the tendency of all governments is to reserve definitive commitments for
country-to-country (bilateral) negotiations. Thus the specific subject of air transportation invariably has become "incidental" to other considerations.
Although many aviation devotees feel that such a situation is highly undesirable,
the fact remains that it is identical with the principles that are commonly employed
in domestic commercial strategy. It would be the height of nalvet6 to contend that
the United States desires an "open sky" primarily to improve the welfare of mankind. By the same token, it would be unfair to contend that the refusal of Great
Britain or any other nation to conform to our views is necessarily reprehensible.
Once again we are confronted with an attempt to rationalize an international problem on the notably fallacious and dangerous theory that since the "open sky" principle would conform to the requirements of the United States, it should be acceptable
to th1e rest of the world-regardless of any political or economic incompatibilities
that may exist. This line of reasoning is usually accompanied by carefully chosen
slogans concerning human progress and liberty, which have the effect of putting the
nations that would oppose it in the position of being literally anti-social. The natural
concomitant of such tactics is friction, which in the long run produces nothing better
than angry and unsatisfactory compromises.
'Address

delivered at meeting of National Aeronautics Association at Minneapolis, Minnesota.
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Perhaps it would be well briefly to consider the diplomatic background of international aviation in order to obtain a clearer understanding of the principle of "air
sovereignty" which, having survived since the heavier-than-air craft became a practical means of transportation, still remains as the most potent obstacle to the practical
liberation of the world's airways.
There is common agreement among students of aviation history that the Air
Navigation Convention concluded in Paris in igi9 laid the cornerstone of international aviation policy. Although the Paris Convention was not formally accepted
by the United States Government, it has in certain aspects withstood the test of
time. In fact, it is noteworthy that it has been used as a pattern for all of the subsequent bilateral and multilateral international aviation commitments that have been
entered into by our government. Ratification by the United States of the Havana
Convention in 1928, and its adherence to the Warsaw Convention of 1939, served

to etch more deeply the basic principles contained in the Paris Convention. However desirable these undertakings may have been, they were not sufficintly comprehensive to keep pace with the rapid growth of the world-wide air communications.
Perhaps the most commonly recognized principle contained in the Paris Convention concerns the question of air sovereignty. This restrictive principle has provoked many attempts to establish an analogy between maritime transportation and
the relatively new art of air transportation. In view of the importance of ridding
aviation policy of any inherited inhibitions, a brief reference to the origin of the
principle of "freedom of the seas" would appear to be in order. In that connection,
Dr. D. Goedhuis, lecturer in Air Law at Leiden University, holds the following
views:7
"Before, however, considering the results attained at these three international conferences, attention may be drawn to the fact that in international communications certain
basic principles remain the same in cause and in effect from age to age. Thus, through
the establishment of the great maritime routes, resulting from the discovery of the passage by the Cape of Good Hope and the discovery of America, the world acquired an
entirely new 6spect: the importance of portions of the earth and their consequent interest
to mankind were fundamentally changed by maritime navigation. In a study of the
character of maritime navigation, two main elements should be distinguished: (I) the
social element, 'man's union with man,' and (2) the element of power, which is to be
subdivided into the economic instrument and the potential military instrument. The
second element has led in the history of the sea to rivalries often culminating in violence;
the first element, however, has caused the law of nations to score its first successes by
reducing the pretensions of states to the exclusive use of the sea. Through the conquest
of the airspaces the aspect of the world has changed in the same way as it was changed
in the sixteenth century through the conquest of the seas. The bases of economic and
political power are being gradually shifted and national ambitions transformed; and in
the future air commerce will exercise an ever-growing influence upon the wealth and
strength of nations. The air will become more and more, therefore, not only a scene of
commercial activities, but of political developments, and the question of air routes will
soon emerge as one involving some of the primary objects of the external policy of nations.
'D. Goedhuis, Civil 4viadon After the War (1942) 36 AM. J. INr. L. 596.
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"In air navigation the same two main elements can be distinguished as have been determined in sea navigation. As through air navigation, however, the limitations of time
and space which nature imposes upon man are overcome to an even greater extent than
through navigation by sea, the social importance of this newest means of communication
surpasses that of all the older means. Since the economic strength represented by air
routes constitutes, as does that of sea routes, an instrument of political power, neither of
them can, even in the purely economic field, be separated from politics. As far as potential military value is concerned, especially for ancillary services, such as training, supply,
and troop carrying, again an analogy exists, though in aviation the threat from a military
point of view is even greater than in sea navigation, the former penetrating to the heart of
a country, horizontally as well as vertically, and practically knowing no bounds.
"A clear realization of the analogies in the problems of sea and air communications is
a necessary precedent to the formulation of those ideas which are to determine the future
status of the air.
"Taking into account the two main elements in air communications that have been
distinguished, the international rules which are to govern these communications should
satisfy two fundamental conditions. They should further the development of air navigation as much as possible; but, as this development will necessarily lead to rivalries, the
rules should be such as not to create a sense of injury or injustice which would cause the
rivalries to culminate in violence."
It becomes important, therefore, to understand the principle of "air sovereignty"
not only because of its common acceptance but because of its deep-rooted emotional
significance. In substance, it asserts that (x) each state has sovereignty over the air
space directly above its territory and territorial waters; (2) each state may decide in

its discretion to permit any foreign aircraft to use the air space under its sovereignty.
Prior to the Paris Convention, various theories had been advanced by reputable
sources with respect to the extent to which the air space might be used as a means
of transportation. Two major theories appear to have been advanced. Proponents
of one theory held that the air was absolutely free and that it could not be subjected
to the control of any country. Later certain proponents of this theory modified their
position by holding that the air space closest to the earth "into which structures on
the surface extended" should be subjected by the subjacent state to such restrictions
or prohibitions as. were deemed to be appropriate. This school of thought held that
the air space above the height of structures on the surface up to the highest altitude
which could be reached by aircraft should enjoy complete freedom from restrictions.

The proponents of the second theory refused to compromise in any manner and
bluntly held that the air space was a part of the territory belonging to the subjacent
state and was subject to the exercise of the sovereignty of that state.
The practical application of these two major theories received serious consideration from the Institute of International Law and the International Law Association
prior to the adoption of the Paris Convention. However, the framers of the final
Convention settled the question by providing an article which stated that "the High
Contracting Parties recognize that every Power has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the air space above its territory." Thereupon each of the contracting
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states undertook to accord "freedom of innocent passage" above its territory to the
aircraft of the other contracting states. Article 15 of the Convention provided, in
part: "Every aircraft of a contracting state has the right to cross the air space of
another state without landing. In this case it shall follow the route fixed by the state
over which the flight takes place." However, in the third paragraph of Article 15,
the following language occurs: "The establishment of international airways shall be
subject to the consent of the states flown over." If we apply the yardstick of practical experience to Article 15, we inevitably reach the conclusion that, aside from
strictly academic discussions, it has resulted in according, a limited freedom of passage in the time of peace to private aircraft, but has given no such freedom to
regularly scheduled commercial air carriers. In the meantime, the United States.
Government has recognized the right of each country to require prior authorization
for the establishment and operation of a regular air transport service for foreign aircraft over its territory. In 1929 at the Extraordinary Meeting of the International
Commission for Air Navigation, only four of the 31 participating countries voted in
favor of freedom of passage in international air commerce. At the conclusion of
this meeting, the text of Article 4 was amplified to read as follows: "Every contracting state may make conditional on its prior authorization the establishment of
international airways and the creation and operating of regular international air
navigation lines, with or without landing, on its territory." Also, Article 15, as
amended, makes it possible for the contracting parties to impose more specific restrictions on foreign air carriers within their air space. The right to restrain the
foreign aircraft from flying over certain "prohibited areas" or "in exceptional circumstances" is to be found among these restrictions.
The influences of the Paris Convention are best demonstrated in the following
air conventions and agreements which the United States has entered into with other
sovereign states since igi9. The multilateral undertakings are the Conventions of
The Hague, Warsaw, and Havana, and the bilateral agreements are with Belgium,
Canada, Colombia, Denmark, France, Germany, Great Britain, Iceland, Irish Free
State (Eire), Italy, Liberia, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain,
Sweden, and the Union of South Africa. They include such subjects as reciprocal
recognition of certificates of airworthiness for imported aircraft, air navigation, certificates of competency or licenses for the piloting of civil aircraft, and air transport
services. Upon examining these records, it becomes apparent that little or no difficulty was experienced in arriving at international understandings in matters pertaining to the technical aspects of aviation. However, it becomes equally apparent that
a restrictive tone permeates practically all such undertakings in so far as the granting
of "rights" is concerned.
Obviously, the parties to the great majority of the formalized diplomatic undertakings other than the bilateral air transport agreements merely extended general
privileges which carefully avoided impingement upon the principles of "air sovereignty." In other words, the sum total of the multilateral conventions of Paris,
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Havana, The Hague, and Warsaw, and the preponderant part of the bilateral agree-

ments to which the United States Government became a party, are innocent of any
abridgment of the "sovereignty" principle. Ambiguities abound in all of the multilateral conventions with the possible exception of the Havana document, which,
nevertheless, still invites interpretative arguments.
Therefore, it is significant that, twenty-five years after the Paris Convention, the

United States delegation at the International Civil Aviation Conference (held at
Chicago between November i and December 7, 1944) maintained the view that:
"Worldwide development of civil aviation is a powerful force for world unity and
world peace;
"A general system of rights for planes to travel and to carry international commerce
should be set up, becoming the established custom of commerce by air, as similar arrangements have become the settled law of commerce by sea;
"These rights of transit and commerce should be available to all nations, permitting
equal opportunity and reasonable competition; and
"All nations should join in a world organization designed both to prevent competitive
excesses and exploitation, and to maintain technical facilities and standards."
In the cold light of retrospection, the progress made at the Chicago Conference

is regrettably overshadowed by the fact that the unenlightened principle of "air
sovereignty" escaped serious impairment. The use of the terms "freedoms" in connection with the Air Transport Agreement of the Final Act of Chicago obviously
was a psychological experiment, but it did not impress many of the really important
conferees. After the opening session of the Conference it became apparent that the
American conception of "freedom" was at considerable variance with the view of
the United Kingdom and of many other nations. This basic irreconcilability had a
most undesirable effect upon the final outcome.
Shortly before the Chicago Convention was convened, the press of the United
Nations was almost unanimous in pointing out the dire need for "teamwork and
understanding engendered in the war effort" in order to avoid "the selfishness and
stupidities of the past." None was more eloquent than the London Tines, which
recommended in its editorial columns that nothing be left undone to achieve in
Chicago "the fullest and freest exploitation of the new power of flight with its untold
benefits to all the world." The position that was taken by the British delegation at
Chicago was, to say the least, at considerable variance with such views. However,
that should not have been surprising.
The bite noire of the Final Act of Chicago was and still is Paragraph 5 of Section
i of the International Air Transport Agreement. In other words, it is the fifth of
the so-called "Five Freedoms." It reads as follows:
"(5) The privilege to take on passengers, mail and cargo destined for the territory
of any other contracting state and the privilege to put down passengers, mail and cargo
coming from any such territory."
' Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Freedoms of the Air (March, 1945) 190
'See DEP'T OF STATE, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION-FINAL
91 for text of this Agreement and this paragraph.
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Although the British subscribed to the Transit Agreement and to a plan for a
permanent international aeronautical organization, they refused categorically to subscribe to Section 5. Their objections were characteristically realistic and, to most
observers, had an undertone of fierce determination to prevent any further encroachments on their weakened economic position.
Approximately three months after the Chicago Conference, former Assistant Secretary of State Adolf A. Berle, Jr., its chairman, made the following brief summary
of what he considered to be the essence of the Final Act of Chicago:"
"The results are what count. The conference obtained:
"I. Agreement to a method of international organization, calling for an air council and
for annual air meetings.
"2. An agreement, familiarly known as the 'two freedoms l agreement, by which all of
the nations which sign it exchange among themselves the privilege of going through the
air of one another's countries along reasonably direct routes (which, however, may be
designated in each country), along with the privilege of landing for refueling, repair, and
the like. This amounts to a generalized right of transit for a plane to go from its own
country by reasonably direct route to and through other countries, and to refuel and
overhaul on the way. As of January i9, 1945, this document has been signed by representatives of twenty-nine countries, whose area includes more than half of the area of the
globe and an overwhelming majority of its population.
"3. A second instrument, known as the 'five freedoms" 2 agreement, consists of a
mutual exchange of privileges not only to transit, but to take on and discharge traffic,
including not only traffic between the country of the plane's origin and the country of its
landing, and from there back home again (the third and fourth freedoms in the Canadian
analysis) but also the privilege of picking up traffic en route. This last is essential, of
course, if long lines are to be maintained; for airlines, like shipping lines, subsist not
merely on traffic from the homeland to other countries and back, but also on traffic between points on the way. Again at the date of this writing, this agreement had been
signed by some eighteen nations and several more had indicated their intention of
signing it.
"These agreements, taken together, open whole subcontinents to peaceful air commerce. Any country, by adhering to the documents of the two freedoms and the five
freedoms, may at once enter this already great and growing basin of air commerce. There
were no such opportunities open before."
Although, as Mr. Berle stated, a heartening number of delegations "signed" the
"Five Freedoms" agreement, it is noteworthy that ten months after the Conference
was concluded only nine governments have formally accepted it. They are: Afghanistan, China, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Liberia, the Netherlands, Paraguay, Turkey
8
(with reservations) and the United States.
10

Berle, snpra note 8.

"' Text is found in op. cit. supra note 9, at 87.

"See supra note 9.

"In an article entitled The Chicago Air Conference-Accomplishments and Unfinished Business, Mr.
Edward Warner, former Deputy Chairman of the Civil Aeronautics Board, said: "The main unfinished
business at Chicago concerned the rights of conducting trade. The two-freedoms agreement on transit
will enable commercial aircraft "to go wherever trade is to be found; but actually to engage in picking
up and discharging passengers and goods will be possible only in the territories of the limited number
of states which have signed the five-freedoms agreement. If trade is to be carried on, either a new
attempt must be made to find a general formula or a network of bilateral, trilateral and quadrilateral
pacts must be negotiated." DP's- OF STATE, BLuEPRINr Fox WORLD CIVIL AVIATION (Pub. No. 2348,
Conf. Ser. 70, 1945).
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In other words, 45 out of the 54 governments that attended the Conference
appear to have decided that their best interests would not be served if they became
parties to a multilateral agreement which would deprive them of the bargaining
advantages inherent in the bilateral type of negotiation. Certainly the importance
of the position taken by Great Britain cannot be minimized; nor can Russia's refusal
to participate be ignored. The same may be said of several other strategically located
nations that have shown no interest in the ultra-liberal American proposal. However, it is not too optimistic to assume that when some of our valiant comrades
across the seas have had an opportunity to bind their wounds, they may undergo a
decided change of attitude toward the "Fifth Freedom" and its antithetical principle
-"air sovereignty."
Many serious students of international relations feel that the Chicago Conference
failed mainly because the American delegation lacked the sure instinct and vision
to neutralize in some degree the frank concern of many nations regarding the overpowering superiority of American air transport enterprises. The argument is advanced that because of the radical nature of Paragraph 5 of the "Five Freedoms" its
inclusion in the Final Act of Chicago was inept and amateurish. In other words,
it is felt that the American delegation "won a skirmish and lost a battle" as the
result of its impetuousness. On the other hand, there is a strong feeling that a modification of Paragraph 5 could have been put into effect at a later date in country-tocountry (bilateral) agreements. In any event, we must face the fact that in the
immediate future our former allies will be more concerned with the stark realities
of postwar survival than we may have the capacity to understand. There is no
reason to believe that any nation will yield to logic or idealism unless by so doing
it can protect its own interests. The desire of a nation such as ours to extend its
unparalleled domestic air transport system to every trade center on earth is highly
laudable, but unless we are willing to make substantial compromises we should be
prepared for serious difficulties, and shape our aviation policy accordingly.

